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Abstract 
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid 
auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, 
we use an experimental design that elicits bidders’ complete bid functions in each round 
(auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium 
predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average 
seller’s revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of 
best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in 
line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication. 
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Since the seminal contributions of Vickrey (1961) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) much of 
the theoretical literature on auctions has focused on the allocative properties of mechanisms 
that involve either weakly dominant bidding strategies, such as the ascending-price auction, or 
the Nash equilibrium concept, such as the first-price sealed bid auction. From a practical 
standpoint, however, while weakly dominant strategies are relatively straightforward to figure 
out and thus very likely to be used, the rationality assumptions underlying the definition of 
Nash equilibrium type of strategies may cast some doubt about their empirical observation.  
For the simplest case of single-unit auctions with private independent values and symmetric 
bidders, evidence from laboratory experiments shows that the revenue and bid predictions for 
first-price sealed bid auctions are systematically violated, mostly because subjects tend to bid 
above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction. Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, 
Smith and Walker (1988) explain such overbidding in terms of a Nash equilibrium model that 
assumes constant relative risk averse bidders (the CRRA model) and numerous studies have 
been conducted to further assess this model.1 While these studies find a remarkable support 
for the CRRA model of bidding, they do not assess the underlying assumption of a strategic 
behavior. Chen and Plott (1998) observe in particular that if bidders’ valuations are uniformly 
distributed, as it is usually the case in auction experiments, then the Nash equilibrium 
strategies are linear and, hence, impossible to disentangle from linear ad hoc bidding rules 
such as a percentage markdown strategy. They report on a series of experiments for which the 
Nash equilibrium predictions are nonlinear and show that the CRRA model is outperformed 
by a non-linear ad hoc model. However, their study also indicates that a belief-free version of 
the CRRA model (i.e., which does not restrict the subjects’ beliefs about the distribution of 
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 See Kagel (1995) for an overview. See Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) for an assessment of behavior in these 
auctions in terms of a quantal response equilibrium. 
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risk parameters) explains the data slightly better than this nonlinear ad hoc model so that even 
in this nonlinear setting, the distinction between game theoretic predictions and those of ad 
hoc models is not stark and, as Chen and Plott (1998) note, it may be sensitive to the 
statistical specifications of the model. 
In this paper, we report an experimental study of behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions 
with symmetric and with asymmetric bidders (i.e., bidders who draw their valuations with 
replacement from different distributions). We study the independent private value framework 
using the theoretical benchmark provided by Maskin and Riley (2000a) in which bidders are 
either Weak or Strong, with the former being more likely to draw lower values than the latter. 
The goal of our analysis is twofold. First, we are interested to check whether the strategic 
considerations that drive the Nash equilibrium outcomes of Vickrey (1961), Cox et al. (1982, 
1988) and Maskin and Riley (2000a) are observed under laboratory conditions. Such 
considerations include the shape of bid functions and the extent of best reply bidding. For the 
asymmetric settings that we consider, the equilibrium bid functions for Weak and Strong 
bidders are nonlinear in values and convey well how each type of bidder should optimally 
react to his/her rival. Therefore, we can easily assess whether bidders perceived the strategic 
implications of their respective value distributions. Second, we are interested to find out 
whether the overbidding observed in symmetric settings is also observed in the more realistic 
case of asymmetric auctions. Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel and Wolfstetter (2002) and Pezanis-
Christou (2002) report experimental evidence that this is generally the case but they do not 
assess this overbidding in terms of equilibrium bidding with constant relative risk preferences. 
Interestingly, the effect of such preferences on bidders’ behavior can explain overbidding in 
asymmetric auction settings, but only over a range of high values. Therefore, by tracking 
behavior across different bidding environments we provide a broader picture of the constant 
relative risk aversion hypothesis as an explanation for overbidding in first-price auctions. 
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A major problem with assessing the extent of strategic behavior in standard auction 
experiments is the stochastic structure of the experiment: in each round, there is only one 
winner and each bidder receives a new value and is asked to submit one bid. Hence, the 
behavior observed in these experiments can be influenced by the history of the game (e.g., the 
realization of valuations and the number of times a bidder won the auction). To circumvent 
this problem, we use a design that induces a bidder to think how to bid for each possible 
valuation that she/he may receive instead of for one specific valuation that she/he receives. 
This design (which is explained in section 3) was proposed by Selten and Buchta (1998) and 
consists in asking each subject to submit a complete bid function (i.e., that produces a bid for 
each possible value) before she/he receives her/his private value. Since this change in bidders’ 
response mode does not affect the information structure or the strategic implications of 
bidding in first-price auctions, we believe that it can provide helpful insights into bidders’ 
strategic behavior. 
Our results indicate that the submitted bid functions support the basic behavioral and revenue 
predictions of the Nash equilibrium models for symmetric and asymmetric auctions. Bidding 
behavior in the symmetric auctions can be explained by the CRRA model that assumes 
homogenous bidders whereas in the asymmetric auctions, it is equally well explained by the 
standard Nash equilibrium model for risk neutral bidders as by the CRRA model for 
homogenous bidders. However, when we check the shape of individual bid functions, we find 
that in the symmetric framework, the predominant submission of concave bid functions does 
not support the predictions of the CRRA model for homogenous or heterogeneous risk averse 
bidders. Nevertheless, about 60% of all bid functions do match the concave shape of the 
corresponding best-reply functions, which are concave in 84% of the time. In the asymmetric 
treatments, both Strong and Weak bidders overbid mostly at low values, for which they 
should submit zero bids, whether they are risk neutral or reasonably risk averse. In terms of 
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shapes, Nash equilibrium predicts convex bid functions for both Strong and Weak bidders 
with either type of risk preferences but this is observed about 49% of the time for Strong 
bidders and about 25% of the time for Weak bidders. Further, the shapes of observed bid 
functions match those of the corresponding best-reply functions about 50% of the time for 
both Strong and Weak bidders. Therefore, the outcomes of our experiment suggest that 
although individual behavior is usually not consistent with the Nash equilibrium predictions 
for both symmetric and asymmetric first-price auctions, it still displays characteristics of best-
reply behavior and it matches the theoretical Nash equilibrium predictions in the aggregate. 
The following section outlines the model of Maskin and Riley (2000a) and the theoretical 
framework we use to analyze data. We determine the Risk Neutral and the Constant Relative 
Risk Averse Nash Equilibrium bidding strategies for our auction games in Section 2. The 
experimental procedure is described in Section 3 and we report on the outcomes in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
1. Theoretical benchmarks  
The bidding model of Maskin and Riley (2000a) extends the symmetric framework of 
Vickrey (1961) to asymmetric settings and can be outlined as follows. There are two bidders, 
S (Strong) and W (Weak), who draw their independent-private values from continuous 
distributions FS  and FW  that are defined on ];[ SSS vvI =  and ];[ WWW vvI = , respectively. In 
a first-price auction, if bidder i has value vi and obtains the item with a bid bi, she/he pays the 
price bi and receives the payoff ii bv − . A pair of bid functions { ( ), ( )}S Wb v b v  (with 
( ) 0i ib v′ > , for i = S, W) is an equilibrium if ( )i ib v  is a best response to ( )j jb v  for all vi in Ii 
and all vj in Ij, with i ≠ j. Let ( )i i ib vφ =  denote the inverse function of ( )i ib v . Bidder i’s 
expected payoff then has the following expression 
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WSjibFbvbvU jjii ,for              ))(()(),( =≠−= φ                         (1) 
Since it is not worth bidding more than the maximum possible bid of one’s competitor, there 
must exist some common maximum bid, b .2 Therefore, in equilibrium, the inverse bid 
functions must satisfy the following two boundary conditions 0)0( =iφ  and 1))(( =bF ii φ  for 
i =  S, W. 
Maskin and Riley (2000a) show that in the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE), inverse 
bid functions )( and )( ** bb WS φφ  are determined as the solution to the system of non-linear 
differential equations generated from the first-order conditions of (1) with respect to b. If we 
assume symmetric bidders, then ( ) ( ) ( )S WF v F v F v= = , ( ) ( ) ( )S Wb b bφ φ φ= =  and 
[ ; ]S WI I I v v≡ ≡ =  so that (1) has a single first order condition with a unique solution for the 
boundary condition φ(0) = 0 .3 Vickrey (1961) established that the RNNE bidding strategy for 
symmetric bidders is 
dx
vF
xF
vvb
v
v
∫−= )( )()(                                                       (2) 
In the case of asymmetric bidders, the system of non-linear differential equations that solve 
the first-order conditions of (1) usually has no analytical solution and has to be determined 
numerically. However, if bidders’ distributions of values satisfy a few additional assumptions, 
Maskin and Riley (2000a, Proposition 3.5) predict that in equilibrium, Strong bidders bid less 
                                                           
2
 See Plum (1992), Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1995), Corns and Schotter (1998), Landsberger, 
Rubinstein, Wolfstetter and Zamir (1999), Lebrun (1999) and Li and Riley (1999) for other asymmetric auction 
models that require a common ceiling on bids. 
3
 Maskin and Riley (2000b) show that if bidders are symmetric, then the equilibrium bidding strategy is unique 
and monotone increasing. 
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aggressively than Weak bidders, so that ( ) ( ),  for all (0; )S Wb v b v v v< ∈ . In addition, they 
provide sufficient conditions on the bidders’ distributions of values to observe different 
rankings of first- and second-price auctions in terms of the seller’s revenues (see their 
Propositions 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). Actually, since it is always a dominant strategy for a bidder to 
bid her/his own valuation in second-price auctions, these revenue rankings are the results of 
bidders’ equilibrium behavior in first-price auctions. On the one hand, if the valuations of the 
Strong bidder are all greater than the maximum valuation of the Weak bidder, then the Strong 
bidder will always outbid the Weak bidder; Maskin and Riley (2000a) refer to this as the 
“Getty effect”. When this happens, second-price auctions yield lower revenues than first-price 
auctions. On the other hand, if there is a positive probability for the Weak bidder to submit no 
bid at all (i.e. the range of values of the weak bidder is partially in the negative domain or 
below the seller’s reserve price), then there is an incentive for the Strong bidder to low-ball, 
i.e., to submit very low bids (close or equal to the seller’s reserve price) for a range of low 
values. It is this incentive to low-ball that makes first-price auctions yield lower expected 
revenues than second-price auctions. Li and Riley (1999) extend this analysis to asymmetric 
auctions with more than two bidders, and who may display constant absolute risk averse 
preferences and/or have affiliated values. One striking result of their analysis is that the effect 
of low-balling on the seller’s expected revenue holds even if bidders are extremely risk averse 
and have uniformly distributed values.  
In what follows, we assume bidders to display homogenous constant relative risk averse 
preferences. Such preferences are well adapted to auction experiments because they 
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encompass risk neutrality as a special case.4 In a symmetric setting, the expected utility 
representation of such preferences is 
( , ) ( ) ( ( ))           with 0ri iU v b v b F b rf= - >                            (4) 
When r = 1, (4) characterizes a risk neutral utility function whereas for r < 1, the marginal 
utility of an additional unit of income decreases so that bidders’ display constant relative risk 
aversion. The Risk Averse Nash Equilibrium (RANE) bidding strategy for symmetric first-
price auctions with two bidders then takes the following expression 
     dx
vF
xF
vvb
v
v
r∫ 



−=
1
)(
)()(       (5) 
For asymmetric first-price auctions there usually are no closed-form RANE equilibrium bid 
functions so that these can only be determined numerically. We derive both the RNNE and 
RANE bid functions for our asymmetric framework in the next section. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
2.1. Design 
We consider two-bidder first-price auctions as described in the previous section and we study 
three treatments: one that involves symmetric bidders and two that involve asymmetric 
bidders (i.e., a Strong bidder and a Weak bidder). All bidders have their values drawn from 
uniform distributions. In our symmetric treatment, all bidders draw their values from IS = 
[0;100]. In our asymmetric treatments, the range of values of the Strong bidders is also IS but 
                                                           
4
 See Holt and Davis (1995) for an outline on the use of the constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion 
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the range of values for Weak bidders IW differs across treatments. Table 1 summarizes the 
treatment parameters and the main characteristics of our experiments. 
We use a simplified version of the design proposed by Selten and Buchta (1998) which 
consists in asking each subject to submit a two-piecewise linear bid function in each round, 
before receiving the private value.5 Since there is no rationale for bidding more than one’s 
value in a first-price sealed-bid auction, subjects were not allowed to chose bid functions that 
could generate a bid greater than the private value drawn. Also, no bid was allowed for 
negative values and the submitted bid function had to span the entire range of possible 
positive values. These conditions imply that the submitted bid function cannot have a non-
zero intercept and that bidder i’s task consists in choosing: i) the coordinates of an interior 
node 1 1( , )i ix y  that could represent a kink in their bid function, and ii) the bid 2iy  
corresponding to the highest possible value iv . With such a design, bidders could choose their 
bid functions from a set of over half a million possible functions. 
As the submitted bid functions are two-piecewise linear instead of differentiable, as in Maskin 
and Riley (2000a), we need to determine the RNNE and the RANE bidding strategies for the 
particular strategy space of our experiments. To this end, we use a numerical procedure that 
traces best reply chains until a rest point is found (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). When deriving 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
concepts in experimental economics. 
5
 Selten and Buchta (1998) examine a symmetric setting which involved three bidders who had their values 
drawn from a uniform distribution on [0;100] and who could submit bid functions that could have up to 10000 
segments. Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, Konigstein and Strobel (2002) use a similar design to compare treatments of 
symmetric first and second price auctions to first and second price “fair division” games. In their experiments, 
subjects’ private values were drawn (with replacement) from a set of 11 possible valuations {50,60,70, …,150} 
and the submitted bids had 11 nodes. 
 9
the RANE bidding strategies, we treat r as a “natural constant” and set it equal to .5, which is 
in the mid-range of the estimates reported in the literature.6 
Tables 2 and 3 report the nodes corresponding to the RNNE and the RANE bid functions for 
our three treatments. Note that since in our experiments, bidders’ strategies are not 
differentiable, the common bid ceiling requirement for continuous and differentiable bidding 
strategies does no more necessarily hold.7 Another point worth noting is that the asymmetry 
in the MIX treatment combines low-balling with the “Getty effect” so that it represents an 
intermediate case between the LOW treatment in which low-balling is important and the SYM 
treatment where there is no incentive at all to low-ball. Further, the equilibrium strategy for 
Strong bidders in MIX is almost identical to the one of Strong bidders in the LOW treatment. 
However, the equilibrium strategies for Weak bidders are very different across treatments. 
This allows us to assess both the extent of low-balling by Strong bidders and the response of 
Weak bidders in different bidding environments. 
Table 1 – Treatment Parameters  
Strong bidder’s 
range of values 
Weak bidder’s 
range of values Treatment 
IS = ],[ SS vv  IW = ],[ WW vv  
Independent 
observations 
subjects per 
independent 
observation 
number of rounds 
per subject 
LOW [0, +100] [–100, +100] 9 6 100 
MIX [0, +100] [–75, +75] 9 6 100 
SYM [0, +100] [0, +100] 6 6 100 
 
                                                           
6
 Goeree et al. (2002) report an estimate of .48 for two-bidder auctions. Cox and Oaxaca (1996) and Chen and 
Plott (1998) report estimates of .33 and .52 for auctions with 4 and 3 bidders, assuming heterogeneous risk 
preferences. Pezanis-Christou and Romeu (2002) report average estimates of homogenous risk preferences that 
range between .39 and 1 for auctions with 3, 4 and 5 bidders. 
7
 The RNNE best response tracing procedure for the LOW treatment converges to a cycle in which the y2 
coordinates of both bidders switch between 30 and 31. 
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Table 2 – Piecewise linear bid functions predicted by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) 
 Strong Weak 
Treatment * *1 1( , )x y  * *2 2( , )x y  slope 1 slope 2 * *1 1( , )x y  * *2 2( , )x y  slope 1 slope 2 
LOW  (41, 0) (100, 30) 0 .51 (13, 0) (100, 31) 0 .36 
MIX (40, 0) (100, 27) 0 .45 (16, 0) (75, 27) 0 .46 
SYM (x, 2x) (100, 50) .50 .50 (x, 2x) (100, 50) .50 .50 
 
Table 3 – Piecewise linear bid functions predicted by the risk averse Nash equilibrium (RANE) with a constant 
relative risk aversion parameter of r = .5 
 Strong Weak 
Treatment * *1 1( , )x y  * *2 2( , )x y  slope 1 slope 2 * *1 1( , )x y  * *2 2( , )x y  slope 1 slope 2 
LOW (29, 0) (100, 48) 0 .68 (5, 0) (100, 52) 0 .55 
MIX (26, 0) (100, 46) 0 .62 (8, 0) (75, 45) 0 .67 
SYM (2x, 3x) (100, 67) .67 .67 (2x, 3x) (100, 67) .67 .67 
 
2.2. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the 
University of Bonn. Most subjects were students in law or economics and were recruited by 
public advertisement on campus. They were required not to have participated in an auction 
experiment before. We considered the three treatments described above: one for low-balling 
(LOW), one for a mixture of low-balling and the “Getty effect” (MIX) and one for the 
symmetric framework (SYM). We conducted a total of 8 experimental sessions: 6 with the 
asymmetric treatments and 2 with the symmetric treatment. In each session, the cohort of 18 
subjects was divided into 3 groups of 6 subjects. These groups were independent in the sense 
that subjects interacted only with the other members of their group. Each session lasted for 
about 3 hours. Average earnings in the experiment were DM 60 (which at that the time of the 
experiment were approximately equal to US$28). 
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Subjects could participate in only one session. At the outset of each session, they received 
instructions that were read aloud (a translation of the instructions is reported in Appendix 1) 
and they were provided a demonstration of the software, using values drawn from different 
distributions than those used in the experiments.8 
Subjects were then randomly assigned to computer terminals. They were informed that they 
would keep their respective types for the whole experiment. In each group of subjects, three 
subjects were of the Strong type and three subjects were of Weak type. Each subject 
interacted only with the three subjects of the other type that were in her/his group. Although 
bidders in the SYM treatment are all of the same type, we used the same matching procedure 
as in the asymmetric treatments so as to keep the statistical analysis of subjects’ behavior in 
terms of types comparable across treatments. 
All subjects participated in 100 auction rounds. At the end of each auction, each participant 
was informed on the own value, the own bid (that resulted from applying the chosen bid 
function to the value), the winning bid, and the own payoff (0, if they lost the auction; [value 
– bid], if they won). This information (including the complete own bid function) was 
appended to a “History” window that could be retrieved at any time during the experiment.  
3. Results 
Most of our conclusions are based on the outcomes of randomization tests for independent or 
related samples of independent observations (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). When we state that 
we have found no significant effect, we mean that the test result was not significant, even at 
α = .10, one-tailed. Furthermore, we recall that after each round, subjects are randomly re-
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 A screenshot of the software (based on RatImage by Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995) is included in the appendix. 
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matched within a given group. Such a design is necessary to avoid the obvious super-game 
effects that would arise from the repeated interaction of the same two bidders in a series of 
auctions. However, such a matching scheme also implies within-group effects: a subject’s 
behavior may be contaminated by the behavior of a previous competitor, who is not 
participating in the current auction. We therefore conduct most of our analysis at the group 
level of aggregation, and conduct tests of individual behavior whenever the independence 
criteria can be fulfilled. 
3.1. Bid shading, Bid ceilings and Average revenues 
3.1.1. Bid Shading 
The extent by which bidders shade their bids is most relevant in the asymmetric treatments 
since in equilibrium, Strong and Weak bidders are expected to bid very differently. We test 
this prediction by comparing the Relative Bid Shading (henceforth, RBS) of Strong bidders to 
those of Weak bidders. As bidders submit complete bid functions before receiving their 
respective values, this measure of bid shading has to account for all possible values that a 
bidder can receive so that we define it as  
WSit
v
vbv
RBS
v
v
v
v
t
i
t
i ,and100,...,1for 
)]([
0
0
==
−
=
∑
∑
=
=
   (6) 
Table 4 reports the average RBS in each treatment. We find no significant difference across 
types in SYM, which is not surprising, since in this treatment all bidders (even though we call 
some “Strong” and others “Weak”) draw their values (with replacement) from the same 
distribution. In the asymmetric treatments, however, Strong bidders shade their bids 
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significantly more than Weak bidders (at α = .01, one-tailed), which is in line with 
Proposition 3.5 of Maskin and Riley (2000a). These predictions hold when we compare the 
(distributions of) linear slope estimates of the observed bid functions: Strong bidders tend to 
submit significantly less steep bid functions than Weak bidders in the asymmetric treatments, 
but not in the symmetric treatment where no significant difference could be diagnosed.  
We also checked whether the bid distributions of Strong bidders are stochastically greater 
than those of Weak bidders as implied by Proposition 3.3 of Maskin and Riley (2000a).9 We 
tested this hypothesis by comparing the distributions of actual bids (i.e., using the realized 
valuations) across bidders’ types and found that bids of Strong bidders are indeed 
stochastically greater than those of Weak bidders in LOW and in MIX, and that they are 
equivalent in SYM. 
3.1.2. Bid Ceilings 
Table 4 reports the average relative deviations from the RNNE and RANE bid ceilings for 
each type of bidder, which are computed as * *2 2 2( ) /ti i iy y y− , with 1,...,100i =  and ,i S W= . A 
comparison of these deviations reveals no significant difference across types in any treatment. 
For the asymmetric settings, this indicates that the bid ceilings are somehow coordinated 
despite the asymmetry in subjects’ preferences and the lack of communication. When 
compared to the RNNE bid ceilings, the observed bid ceilings are significantly greater than 
those predicted for the LOW and SYM treatments but we find no significant difference 
between observed and predicted ceilings for the MIX treatment. When compared to the 
                                                           
9
 This proposition actually predicts first-order stochastic dominance, which in this case is best approximated 
with non-parametric statistics that check whether one sample is stochastically greater than another or not. 
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RANE predictions, the bid ceilings of both Strong and Weak bidders are significantly lower 
than predicted in all treatments. 
Table 4 – Bid Shading and Bid Ceilings.   
Relative deviations from bid ceilings  
RBSa 
RNNE RANE 
 Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
LOW 
(9 obs) 
.61 
 (.11) 
.52 
 (.08) 
.10** 
(.21) 
.12** 
(.21) 
-.08** 
(.21) 
-.09** 
(.21) 
MIX 
(9 obs) 
.72 
 (.09) 
.54 
 (.11) 
.00 
(.24) 
.05 
(.23) 
-.19** 
(.24) 
-.19** 
(.23) 
SYM 
(6 obs) 
.37 
 (.08) 
.34 
 (.07) 
.06* 
(.16) 
.07** 
(.12) 
-.11** 
(.16) 
-.10** 
(.12) 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis; a Relative Bid Shading;  
**
 Significant at α = .05; * Significant at α = .10 (one-tailed) 
 
3.1.3. Revenues 
Table 5 reports the observed and expected revenues. In all treatments, observed revenues are 
significantly greater than those expected in the RNNE (at α = .02, one-tailed), but are not 
different from those expected in the RANE. The observation that revenues in SYM are closer 
to the RANE than to the RNNE predictions is in line with the received literature that explains 
overbidding in symmetric first-price auctions in terms of constant relative risk aversion. 
Since the conclusions remain unchanged for the last 25 rounds of the experiment, we infer 
that both the behavior of Strong and Weak bidders and the revenues generated by the different 
treatments are consistent with the basic predictions of the Nash equilibrium models studied.  
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Table 5 –Average Seller’s Revenues (and Standard Deviation) 
 Observed RNNE RANE 
LOW 
(9 obs) 
24.87 
 (4.47) 
12.50 
 (.74) 
23.06 
 (1.16) 
MIX 
(9 obs) 
18.51 
 (5.35) 
10.61 
 (.33) 
21.15 
 (.56) 
SYM 
(6 obs) 
42.47 
 (3.89) 
33.40 
 (.66) 
44.53 
 (.88) 
 
3.2. Nash equilibrium behavior, Empirical Best Replies and shapes 
of bid functions 
3.2.1. Nash Equilibrium Behavior 
The plots in Figure 1 show that the average bid functions are better tracked by the RANE 
prediction in the symmetric treatment than in the asymmetric treatments. In the latter, 
although Strong bidders bid less aggressively than Weak bidders for equal values, they 
overbid mostly at low values, which is inconsistent with the risk neutral or risk averse 
equilibrium predictions for these treatments. 
To assess the explanatory power of these models, we compare the Relative Squared 
Deviations from the RNNE and RANE bid functions (henceforth, RSD). We define RSD for 
bidder type i in round t as  
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
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where *( )ib v  stands for the RNNE or the RANE bid function of type i and the denominator for 
the maximum possible deviation from that strategy.  
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Figure 1: Average Bid Functions (all rounds) 
Table 6 reports the average RSDs and the test results of a comparison to the Nash equilibrium 
predictions we considered. The deviations from the RNNE and RANE predictions are 
relatively small, between 4% and 17% of the maximum possible deviations. However, those 
from RANE are significantly smaller than those from RNNE for both Strong and Weak 
bidders only in the symmetric treatment. In the asymmetric treatments, with the exception of 
Strong bidders in MIX for whom the RNNE model outperforms the RANE one, the two 
models perform equally well in explaining deviations. Deviations from RANE are also 
significantly smaller in the symmetric treatment than in the asymmetric ones. As these 
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patterns hold in the last 25 rounds, it appears that neither of these models provides a 
consistent explanation of the behavior observed in the three treatments.10  
Table 6 – Average RSDs from Nash Equilibrium Bid Functions (Standard Deviations) 
 Strong Weak 
 RNNE RANE RANE vs RNNE† RNNE RANE 
RANE vs 
RNNE† 
LOW 
(9 obs) 
.13 
 (.07) 
.14 
 (.07) 
no signif. 
difference 
.14 
 (.04) 
.14 
 (.07) 
no signif. 
difference 
MIX 
(9 obs) 
.09 
 (.05) 
.17 
 (.05) RNNE 
***
 
.13 
 (.08) 
.17 
 (.10) 
no signif. 
difference 
SYM 
(6 obs) 
.15 
 (.06) 
.06 
 (.03) RANE 
*
 
.15 
 (.09) 
.04 
 (.01) RANE 
**
 
†
 This column reports the model with significantly smaller RSDs. 
Significance levels:  *** α = .01; ** α = .05; * α = .10 (one-tailed) 
 
Such significant deviations from the Nash equilibrium predictions could be due to the 
bidder’s response mode, which is different from the one traditionally used. We therefore 
considered the actual valuations that bidders received in the LOW treatment and conducted 
the same tests as those reported in Pezanis-Christou (2002) which referred to similar LOW 
sessions that were conducted with the traditional design. As we find no significant difference 
across designs and as we reach the same conclusions, we infer that the observed behavior is 
not significantly affected by the response mode we used in this experiment. Also, all our 
conclusions for the three treatments remain unchanged when we test theoretical predictions 
with the actual valuations and bids. 
                                                           
10
 For all treatments, we checked whether subjects’ bidding behavior converges to the RNNE or RANE 
predictions. Although we find negative Spearman rank correlation coefficients (between RSDs and t) for many 
groups, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no convergence. 
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3.2.2. Empirical Best Replies 
A drawback of the analysis of deviations from a Nash equilibrium prediction is that it 
foregoes an assessment of the subjects’ strategic behavior. Indeed, a comparison between 
observed and equilibrium bid functions can be misleading because the latter are unlikely to be 
best replies to the rivals’ bid functions. We therefore follow Avery and Kagel (1997) by 
studying deviations from best reply bidding.11 We do so by determining for each type of 
bidder in each treatment, the Empirical Best Reply (EBR) function, which is the risk neutral 
best reply bid function to the distribution of the actual rivals’ bid functions. 
In contrast to previous studies that compared the observed behavior in round t to an estimated 
best reply from the data of all rounds, our design allows us to compare, in each round, a 
bidder’s bid ( )tib v  to the EBR bid given the valuation that this bidder received in this 
particular round. We compute a bidder’s relative error as the ratio of the difference between 
the bid and the EBR bid to the bidder’s valuation, and we report the aggregate distributions 
for each type and treatment in Figure 2. These distributions assume a bin range of 0.025 so 
that errors in (–0.0125; +0.0125] are labeled as 0; errors in (+0.0125; +0.0375] are labeled as 
0.025, etc. The plots indicate that although the distributions of both Strong and Weak bidders 
usually have a modal frequency at 0, they are also skewed towards positive relative errors, 
especially for Strong bidders in the LOW treatment. In this treatment, the modal frequency of 
Strong bidders is at 0.5, followed by 0.4 and 0.  
                                                           
11
 Avery and Kagel (1997) look at deviations from EBR payoffs in their “ε-equilibrium” analysis of behavior in 
second-price auction experiments with common-values and asymmetric private advantages. Fudenberg and 
Levine (1997) look at deviations from EBR payoffs in their “ε-self-confirming equilibrium” analysis of simple 
extensive-form game experiments. Selten, Abbink, Buchta and Sadrieh (2002) look at deviations from EBR 
payoffs in their “best reply ratio” analysis of 3x3 normal-form game experiments. Because we observe subjects’ 
complete bid-functions and because the values are drawn (with replacement) from a uniform distributions, 
comparing (squared) deviations from EBR functions is analogous to comparing deviations from EBR payoffs.  
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Figure 2: Aggregate Distributions of Relative Errors  
Treatment LOW (Strong: 2700 obs.; Weak: 1359 obs.) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Treatment MIX (Strong: 2700 obs.; Weak: 1348 obs.) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
SYM Treatment (Strong: 1800 obs.; Weak: 1800 obs.)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Strong Weak
 20
Table 7 reports summary statistics on the group distributions of relative errors in each 
treatment. Deviations from risk neutral best reply bids are significantly different across types 
(at α=.05, two-tailed) only in the LOW treatment; with Strong bidders making larger relative 
errors than Weak bidders. Across treatments, Strong bidders deviate significantly more in 
LOW than in MIX or SYM; otherwise we find no significant difference in the relative 
deviations of Strong and Weak bidders. The relative frequencies of “0 relative errors” 
represent less than 10% of all observations for a given type/treatment configuration and we 
did not find significant differences across bidders’ types or treatments. In the last 25 rounds of 
the experiments, we find no significant difference in the behavior of Strong bidders when the 
LOW and MIX treatments are compared, and our conclusions about cross-treatment 
comparisons remain unchanged.12  
Table 7 – Average Relative Deviations from Risk Neutral Best-Reply Bidding. 
 Strong Weak 
 Error % of “0 errors” Error % of “0 errors” 
LOW 
(9 obs) 
.28 
 (.13) 
5.96 
(4.77) 
.13 
 (.08) 
6.88 
(4.47) 
MIX 
(9 obs) 
.14 
 (.13) 
4.89 
(2.21) 
.12 
 (.08) 
6.79 
(2.37) 
SYM 
(6 obs) 
.09 
 (.06) 
4.56 
(1.00) 
.14 
 (.08) 
9.44 
(4.76) 
 
Such significant cross-treatment differences allude more to type- or environment-specific 
patterns than to a pattern that is inherent to bidders’ preferences. The finding of skewed 
distributions can equally result from bidders’ heterogeneous behavior, whether it is ad hoc or 
rational (as assumed by the CRRA model for heterogeneous bidders of Cox et al., 1988), as 
from a homogenous misbehavior such as the miscalculation of winning probabilities and/or a 
                                                           
12
 We also considered bidders’ errors instead of bidders’ relative errors and reached similar conclusions. 
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“joy of winning” as studied by Goeree et al. (2002) in the context of QRE models. In the next 
section, we check whether any of the EBR, the RNNE and the RANE outperforms the others 
in explaining the shapes of the submitted bid functions. 
3.2.3. Shapes of Bid Functions 
As subjects submitted complete bid functions in every round, the classification of bid 
functions in different shapes is straightforward. We categorize them into four possible shapes: 
Concave, Convex, Linear, and Humped. We assume a bid function to be concave if (s1 – s2)/s1 
> .05 and s2 ≥ 0, where s1 and s2 stand for the slopes of the first and second segments of the 
piecewise linear bid function. We define a bid function as convex if (s1 – s2)/s1 < -.05; as 
linear if |(s1 – s2)/s1| ≤ .05 and as humped if (s1 – s2)/s1 > .05 and s2 < 0. A comparison of the 
relative frequencies of each shape to the relative frequencies of EBR shapes allows an 
additional qualitative assessment of the extent of strategic behavior. 
3.2.3.1. Asymmetric Treatments 
Figure 3 reports the relative frequencies of each shape in the asymmetric treatments, together 
with the proportion of submitted bid functions that have a shape matching the one of the EBR 
in a particular round t. In both treatments, the shapes of observed and EBR functions are 
mostly convex for Strong bidders (about 49% of all their bid functions) and concave for Weak 
bidders (about 49% of all their bid functions). Convex-shaped bid functions for Strong 
bidders match the Nash equilibrium predictions and represent 82% of all EBR functions. In 
both treatments, such matched cases with convex bid functions accounted for about 40% of 
the Strong bidders’ observed strategies. The upper panels of Figure 4 report the plots of 
average convex bid functions and indicate that Strong bidders did not low-ball enough when 
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compared to the RNNE or RANE predictions. Interestingly, the average shape of convex EBR 
functions is almost identical to the one predicted in the RNNE for both treatments (cf. Figure 
1) so that the low-balling prediction of Maskin and Riley (2000a) is empirically robust to the 
behavior of Weak bidders. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of bid function shapes in LOW and MIX (S: Strong, W: Weak) 
The submission of concave bid functions by Weak bidders (49%) is not supported by the 
RANE (or RNNE) prediction. However, such a shape is frequently recommended as a best-
reply to the observed behavior of Strong bidders, since 75% of all EBR functions for Weak 
bidders are concave. In both treatments, such matched cases with concave functions constitute 
about 40% of all bid functions submitted by Weak bidders. Furthermore, while Nash 
equilibrium predicts convex bid functions for Weak bidders in both treatments, the observed 
and the EBR functions are convex in only about 20% to 30% of the cases. The plots in the 
lower panels of Figure 4 reveal a close fit of the shape of the average concave bid functions to 
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the shape of the average concave EBR functions.13 To this extent, submitting a concave bid 
function is more characteristic of a best-reply to the Strong bidders’ lack of low-balling than 
submitting a convex bid function as predicted by the Nash equilibrium. 
Such bid patterns, which remain virtually unchanged for the last 25 rounds of the experiment, 
suggest that from a theoretical perspective, the Nash equilibrium predictions for Strong 
bidders are more robust to the out-of-equilibrium behavior of Weak bidders than what the 
predictions for Weak bidders are to the out-of-equilibrium behavior of Strong bidders. From 
an empirical point of view, the observed behavior suggests that the lack of low-balling by 
Strong bidders is the main reason for not observing the predicted outcomes. 
 
3.2.3.2. Symmetric Treatment 
The left-hand panel of Figure 5 reports the relative frequencies of each shape in the SYM 
treatment. About 73% of all bid functions are concave and only 10% have the linear shape 
predicted by RNNE and RANE. The submission of concave bid functions appears to be 
consistent with best-reply bidding since this shape represents 84% of all EBR functions. The 
frequencies of matched (observed and EBR) Concave shapes are also the highest in this 
treatment and represent about 60% of all submitted bid functions. The plots in Figure 6 
further indicate that these concave bid functions share the non-linear characteristics of best-
reply bidding. As these patterns remain unchanged for the last 25 rounds of the experiment, 
the data clearly indicate that the submission of linear bid functions, as predicted by RNNE 
and RANE, is not robust to the out-of-equilibrium behavior of competitors. 
 
                                                           
13
 The plots of Weak (Strong) bidders are virtually identical to those of concave (convex) bid functions that 
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Figure 4: Average Concave and Convex Bid Functions in LOW and MIX 
In the symmetric setting, the submission of concave bid functions may be consistent with the 
CRRA model of Cox et al. (1988), which assumes heterogeneity in the bidders’ risk attitudes. 
In that model, bidder i’s utility function is defined as ( ) iriv b− , with ir  i.i.d. according to 
max:[0, ]G r  and where rmax stands for the coefficient of the less risk averse bidder. If 
valuations are uniformly drawn, the CRRA equilibrium strategies are linear and can be 
determined only up to a maximum bid b , which is itself determined by the number of bidders 
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and maxr  as max( 1) /( 1 )b n n r= − − + . The slopes of the linear part of these bid functions are 
greater than the slope of the RNNE bid function (i.e., greater than 0.5). As most previous 
experiments report a significant overbidding, rmax is usually set equal to 1 so that in our case 
50b = . For bids greater than b  these equilibrium strategies have to be approximated 
numerically (Van Boening, Rassenti and Smith, 1998). However, an interesting property of 
the CRRA model is that when valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution, then, for a 
given rmax, the linear parts of the CRRA bid functions are invariant to the distribution of risk 
parameters so that we only need to specify the support of the distribution of risk parameters to 
determine them. To this extent, the testing of the CRRA hypothesis would almost revert to the 
testing of a belief-free model in the sense of Chen and Plott (1998). As the CRRA model 
predicts concave bid functions for ri < 1, it could therefore provide a good fit of the observed 
behavior.14 We recall that the random matching of subjects in our experiment prevents the 
assessment of individual behavior so that we only check for a qualitative fit of this model 
rather than estimating the individual CRRA parameters. 
The data reported in the right-hand panel of Figure 5 indicates that CRRA bid functions 
represent about 18% of all bid functions whereas non-CRRA concave functions represent 
about 60% of them. A similar ratio of CRRA-to-concave bid functions is observed for the 
EBR functions (23% vs. 61%) and the matching frequencies also show sharp differences in 
favor of the submission of non-CRRA concave bid functions. To this extent, the latter would 
better represent best-reply bidding than CRRA or RANE bid functions. 
                                                           
14
 Cox et al. (1988) and Cox and Oaxaca (1996) report some non-linearity (concavity) in the estimated bid 
functions, but conclude that it is generally insignificant and that the data are best explained by linear bid 
functions. However, Pezanis-Christou and Romeu (2002) use structural econometric methods and show that 
these non-linearities are often significant and that the observed heterogeneity in behavior usually implies a 
rejection of the CRRA model of bidding. Selten and Buchta (1998) also report non-linear bid functions, many of 
which displaying a concavity in their shapes. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of bid function shapes in SYM 
For each bidder, we count the number of rounds in which she/he submitted a CRRA bid 
function, assuming 50b =  (i.e., max 1r = ). A bid functions qualifies as a “CRRA bid 
function” if it is linear with s1 ≥ .5, s2 ≥ 0 and y2 ≥ 50 or concave with s1 ≥ .5, 0 ≤ s2 < s1, 
50b = , y1 ≥ b  and y2 ≥ b . It appears that for 28 out of 36 subjects who ever submitted 
CRRA bid functions, the average rate of submission of such bid functions is 22%. We test the 
null hypothesis that the probability for a bidder to submit a CRRA bid function is equal to 0.5 
against the alternative that it is smaller than 0.5. According to the Binomial test, we cannot 
reject this hypothesis for only 6 subjects (at α=.05 one-tailed). When the test is conducted 
over the last 25 rounds, we cannot reject the null of CRRA bidding for one more bidder and 
the modal frequency is still on Concave (i.e., about 70% of all bid functions). Therefore, as, 6 
or 7 CRRA bidders out of 36 do not represent a significant rate of success according to the 
Binomial test, we infer that subjects are not likely to submit CRRA bid functions. We also 
tested a softer version of the CRRA model which assumes y1 > 40 so that we allow for a non-
linearity at 40b >  instead of the critical 50b = . In this case the mode of the distribution of 
shapes remains on Concave (57%, followed by CRRA: 31%) and we cannot reject the null of 
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CRRA bidding for 11 subjects (and for 12 subjects in the last 25 rounds), which does not 
represent a significant success rate according to the Binomial test either. 
Figure 6: Average Concave Bid Functions in SYM 
As far as the frequency of matched shapes can be used as a proxy for best-reply behavior, the 
above analysis in terms of (four possible) shapes would suggest that the extent of best-reply 
behavior is roughly the same across types within a treatment but that it changes across 
treatments, especially between symmetric and asymmetric treatments. In the aggregate, the 
observed shapes match the EBR ones in 48% of times in LOW, in 40% of times in MIX and 
in 61% of times in SYM, so that subjects would be closer to best reply bidding in symmetric 
settings than in the more complex bidding environment of asymmetric settings.  
4. Summary and Conclusion 
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that underlie the Nash equilibrium predictions for first-price sealed bid auctions with 
independent private values. The outcomes indicate that the observed behavior supports the 
basic Nash equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or risk averse bidders: i) Strong bidders bid 
less aggressively than Weak bidders in the asymmetric bidding environments but not in the 
SYM Strong
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Value
Bi
d
Concave Conc.EBR
SYM Weak
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Value
Bi
d
 28
symmetric one, where no significant difference across bidders’ (pseudo-)types are expected or 
observed; ii) both types of bidders submit similar bid ceilings, whether the auction is 
symmetric or not; iii) the observed revenues are not significantly different from those 
predicted by a Nash equilibrium model for constant relative risk averse bidders and iv) 
aggregate behavior in symmetric auctions is best explained by a Nash equilibrium model for 
the constant absolute risk averse bidders and the one of asymmetric auctions is equally well 
explained by a Nash model for risk neutral or homogenous constant relative risk averse 
bidders. 
However, when we compare the shapes of the individual bid functions to the shapes of best-
reply bid functions, then the data is much less supportive of the Nash equilibrium predictions. 
In the symmetric environment, bid functions are mostly concave and they match the concave 
shape of the (risk neutral) best-reply bid function in 60% of the time. Hence, although such a 
behavior is neither in line with the Nash equilibrium predictions for homogenous nor for 
heterogeneous bidders with constant relative risk aversion (cf. Cox et al. 1982, 1988), it does 
display clear characteristics of best-reply behavior. In the asymmetric bidding environments, 
Strong bidders submit convex bid functions about half of the time but they do not “low-ball” 
enough when compared to the Nash equilibrium predictions. This lack of low-balling is not 
supported by best-reply behavior since the latter recommends 80% of the time bid functions 
that are, on average, very similar to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction. To the 
contrary, Weak bidders submit concave bid functions about half of the time, which are not 
supported by the Nash equilibrium. They do, however, match the characteristics of a best-
reply behavior that recommends concave functions about 75% of the time.  
The outcomes of our experiment thus suggest that bidders’ behavior is more governed by 
strategic considerations than by ad hoc bidding rules. Such strategic considerations are more 
 29
evident in a symmetric environment than in the asymmetric environments that we considered. 
Although the received Nash equilibrium models are well supported only in the aggregate, our 
analysis of the asymmetric bidding environments indicates that the low-balling predictions of 
Maskin and Riley (2000a) are remarkably robust to the out-of-equilibrium behavior of Weak 
bidders. To this extent, we can conjecture that a necessary condition to observe the revenue 
implications of bidders’ asymmetric preferences is that Strong bidders do indeed low-ball as 
expected. 
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Appendix 1 – Instructions 
Brief Outline 
Each of you is about to particpate in a series of 100 auctions. 
In each auction, you are randomly matched with one other participant whose identity is unknown to you. 
In each auction, a hypothetical item is sold either to you or to the other participant. 
You receive the item if your bid is the higher bid submitted. 
You make a gain (profit) if you receive the item and if your bid is smaller than your resale value. 
The resale value for each of the 100 items that you will bid for is randomly drawn from a given range. 
Bidder Types 
Before the experiment starts, each participant draws a card that detrmines her/his type : You will either be a A-
type or a B-type bidder. 
Your type remains the same throughout the experiment. 
If you are a A-type, in each auction, your resale value is drawn with an equally likely chance from the range 
[0 ;100]. 
If you are a B-type, in each auction, your resale value is drawn with an equally likely chance from the range [-
100 ;100]. 
A A-type bidder is always matched with a B-type bidder and vice-versa. 
Submitting the Bid Function 
A bid function specifies a bid for every possible resale value between 0 and 100. A bid cannot be greater than its 
corresponding resale value. 
Your bid function always consists of 2 lines connecting the 3 points B0, Bv and Bmax. 
. The point B0 specifies the bid that you submit if you receive the resale value 0. This bid is always equal to 0. 
. The point Bv specifies the bid you submit if you receive the resale value v, which is any arbitrary value 
between 1 and 99. 
. The point Bmax specifies the bid you submit if you receive the resale value 100. 
. The bid that you submit if you receive a resale value between 0 and v is determined by the line connecting B0 
and Bv. Similarly, the bidthat you submit if you receive a resale value between v and 100 is determined by the 
line connecting Bv and Bmax. 
Your task is to choose Bv and Bmax at the outset of each auction, before your resale value is drawn. 
Each bidder knows his own bid function but not the one of the other participant. 
Resale Values and Bids 
After you have chosen your bid function, your resale value for the current auction is randomly drawn. 
Once your resale value is drawn, one of the following two situations occurs : 
If your resale value is smaller than 0 (which can happen only to B-type bidders), you cannot submit a bid. 
If your resale value is greater or equal to 0, your bid is determined by your bid function and is automatically 
submitted. 
Awards 
If only one of the bidders could submit a bid, she/he is awarded the item. 
If both bidders could submit a bid, the one with the higher bid is warded the item. 
If both bidders submit the same bid, one of them will be randomly chosen (each with probability of one half) to 
be awarded the item. 
The bidder who is awarded the item makes a gain which is equal to his resale value minus the bid. 
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The bidder who is not awarded the item makes no gain. 
Payoffs 
Your total profit from participating in this experiment is equal to the sum of your gains in the 
auction. 
Your total profit is exchanged at the rate of 0.04DM per point. 
 
Appendix 2 – Screen shot 
Screen shot of a strong bidder’s terminal in the treatment LOW. The presented auction is 
fictitious. Auction 3 (called “round 3” in the experiment) has just elapsed. The next auction 
begins as soon as all participants have pressed the “continue” button. 
 
 
